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ANNEX A


SUBJECT: A Covert Harassment/Sabotage Program against Cuba

I. This paper presents a covert Harassment/Sabotage program targetted against Cuba; included are those sabotage plans which have previously been approved as well as new proposals. While this program will cause a certain amount of economic damage, it will in no sense critically injure the economy or cause the overthrow of Castro. It may, however, create a situation which will delay the consolidation and stabilization of Castro's revolution and may cause some of his 26 July followers to doubt Castro's ability successfully to create a new Cuba.

Losses in men and equipment with the attendant adverse publicity must be expected. Even without such losses, U. S. attribution will be claimed.

When the policy and guidelines of the overall sabotage program are established, it will be possible progressively to develop up to a limit additional covert assets and support capabilities. However, materially to increase the pace of operations, a period of four to six months is required. Ultimate limiting factors are weather, length of "dark-of-the-moon" period each month and appropriate targets. A source of additional agent personnel is from Cuban personnel trained by the U. S. Military Forces under the recent programs, but released to civilian status.

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II. PREVIOUSLY APPROVED PROGRAMS


A. SUBTLE SABOTAGE PROGRAM

The use of a variety of propaganda media to stimulate passive resistance and low-risk, simple sabotage actions by the populace of Cuba. Acts such as the contamination of fuels and lubricants, the introduction of foreign material into moving parts of machinery, and administrative acts of omission and commission are illustrative examples of type of activity which we will attempt to stimulate. This program was later supplemented by approval to incite Cubans within Cuba to commit acts of sabotage and harassment against Soviet personnel in Cuba, with a view toward making the Soviet presence in Cuba increasingly more onerous, embarrassing and untenable. Acts such as the use of "Russian go home" slogans would be urged and unattributable mail propaganda will call for more aggressive actions such as physical violence against Soviet personnel and equipment.

CAPABILITIES

The keystone of the Subtle Sabotage program is the unattributed mailing program. The mailing program is being conducted from most Latin American countries, some European countries, and the United States and currently involves about 50,000 pieces of mail per month. Propaganda

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and instructions are sent giving a variety of subtle sabotage techniques in appropriate detail. Several hundred letters are infiltrated into Cuba each month for domestic mailing in support of this program.

The mailing program is being supplemented by the use of short and medium wave broadcasts beamed at Cuba from eight different stations. The main technique is to air real or fabricated letters telling of acts of sabotage and resistance within Cuba and referring to historical examples. Thus without exhorting the Cubans to action, we are giving them examples of what they can do and how to do it while subtly encouraging them to participate. As other harassment/sabotage programs progress, we plan to replay more and more actual cases of happenings, both of our own activities and of independent resistance elements. Our propaganda efforts will also be intensified with increased emphasis on stimulating active opposition to the regime and acts of major sabotage and harassment.

PACE

The mailing program will remain at approximately 30,000 pieces per month with the emphasis on subtle sabotage

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gradually being increased. We expect to increase the infiltration of items for mailing within Cuba to about 800 pieces per month by developing additional diplomatic and legal traveler channels. We are developing a comprehensive pamphlet giving detailed instructions on the theory and practice of resistance with an emphasis on subtle sabotage. These will be introduced in a variety of ways at the appropriate time.

The radio broadcasts currently beam 270 hours per week at Cuba from 8 different stations. Throughout these broadcasts subtle sabotage themes are inserted. Plans are underway to increase the broadcast hours to 350 per week, utilizing a total of 12 stations and gradually stepping up the emphasis on subtle sabotage.


B. SABOTAGE OF CUBAN OWNED SHIPPING

Two types of sabotage have been approved:

(1) The placing of incendiary devices and/or explosives with suitable time delay within the hull or cargo to disable or sink Cuban vessels and/or damage their cargos while on the high seas.

(2) Introducing abrasives or other damaging materials into the propulsion, communication and other systems of the ship to inactivate the ship.

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CAPABILITIES

At the present time there are 26 agent assets of varying quality aboard 12 Cuban merchant ships (approximately half of the Cuban Merchant Marine). Although a quarter of these agents agreed to undertake sabotage during the crisis period of September-October 1962, none of them was tested in this regard. Most of the others have not been asked. We are confident that a major act of sabotage can be achieved against two or three of these vessels. It may be possible, however, to develop more limited acts of sabotage in a larger number of ships.

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PACE

Barring unusual circumstances, it should be possible to accomplish an initial major act of sabotage on a Cuban ship prior to mid-June. Following the initial effort and depending upon the reliability of the various recruited agents on board, it should be possible to develop an operation of this type at an approximate rate of one per month as long as

Cuban merchant marine ships visit at Hamburg, Antwerp,

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Casablanca, or Vera Cruz. It may be possible to use

Canadian ports but in view of the difficulty of obtaining access through the Canadians they may be excluded.

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III. NEW PROPOSALS

A. ADDITIONAL MEANS OF SABOTAGE OF CUBAN OWNED SHIPPING

The placing of explosive devices with suitable time delays on the outside of ships either in Cuban or in non-Cuban ports.

CAPABILITIES

A six man Cuban underwater demolition team (UDT) has been undergoing training and will be in operational readiness by the end of June 1963. They are competent in the use of open and closed circuit SCUBA and have been conducting simulated limpet operations using inert materials. Their training will be completed in June, culminating in a series of exercises using live demolitions under operational conditions. Adequate intelligence support and targetting data are available to plan and execute UDT operations in selected ports. In some cases non-UDT assets in small boats may be used to place limpets on Cuban ships.

PACE

The first attack could be made in July 1963 and we could mount one every other month thereafter, depending upon the location and availability of targets. Preliminary targetting

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indicates that the first such operations would probably take place at Cuban south coast ports such as Manzanillo or Niquero or on a Cuban ship in a free world port permitting access to the vessel. The preferred port for doing this would be **Vera** **Cruz, Mexico,** but it could be done in some European ports also. It is not anticipated that we could obtain sufficient local support for such an action to undertake it in **Canada.** 11

BENEFITS

Increased strain on Soviet/Bloc shipping.

Destruction or damage to vital cargos.

Disruption of shipping schedules - particularly the delivery of vital materials and spare parts.

Demoralization of Cuban crews.

REPERCUSSIONS

Allegations of U. S. sponsorship.

Alleged "murder" of Cuban sailors.

Claims that ships were torpedoed by U. S. submarines.

Possible reprisals against U. S. ships.

Estimate of Soviet Reactions:


Whenever an incident occurs, the Soviets will be quick to suspect U. S. involvement; they are likely to set in motion

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their propaganda machines to allege at least U. S. connivance, although this probably will not develop into a major campaign unless the Soviets manage to turn up some tangible evidence of U. S. implication. If there are recurrent incidents, the Soviets may utilize diplomatic channels and possibly the UN to bring pressure on the U. S. to get an end put to the program.

It is barely possible that if a pattern of incidents develops the Soviets through their own sabotage apparatus, or by inciting the Cubans, may engage in some sabotage of U. S. vessels. They would hope in this way to get across the message that two can play the game and thus to get the program stopped. But the Soviets would be aware of the risks of getting caught at this sort of retaliation and these risks are likely to have a very considerable sobering influence on them. Perhaps somewhat more likely, the Soviets might encourage the Cubans to supply ship crews with small arms with which to attack the sabotage teams, if they are detected, and thus to ward off the program. In general, however, forceful reactions directly involving the Soviets seem unlikely.



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B. HARASSMENT ATTACKS ON CUBAN SHIPS IN CUBAN WATERS


Surface attacks by Maritime assets firing on Cuban ships in Cuban waters. Where the maritime asset cannot reach the target, shore based attacks on shipping in port or passing among the offshore keys may be undertaken.

CAPABILITIES

Our present maritime assets have an acceptable capability to attack Cuban ships with recoilless rifles, rocket launchers or automatic weapons such as 20 mm. cannon. The craft which we would probably use are sport fishermen manned by Cubans and capable of speeds in excess of 30 kts. By the end of July we expect to add two PT type, gas turbine boats to our fleet, whose 40 kt. plus speed and maneuverability will significantly increase our surface attack capability. Adequate intelligence support and targetting data are available properly to plan and execute these attacks on selected Cuban ships.

For shore based attacks two separate groups, one of 22 and one of 16 Cubans have been given thorough paramilitary training and, while only a few have had any operational experience to date, they are considered operationally ready for two or three

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man teams to be infiltrated on one of the off-shore keys or on the approaches to a harbor from which they could fire on Cuban ships with recoilless rifles or rocket launchers. Adequate intelligence support and target data are available properly to plan and execute these operations against selected Cuban ships.

PACE

The first surface attack could be launched in May with one every month thereafter. With sufficient targets, two attacks per month are possible. Preliminary targetting indicates the first such operations would probably be conducted in the Cayo Frances Area of Northern Las Villas or in the Golfo de Guacanayabo off Southern Oriente.

If surface attacks cannot reach a target, an alternative shore-based attack could be made in June 1963 and one every month thereafter. Preliminary targetting indicates the first such operations would probably be conducted off the north coast of Camaguey in the Cayo Cruz area or off the south coast of Camaguey in the Jardines de la Reina area.

BENEFITS

Disruption of coastal commerce.

Increased strain on Cuban land transportation.

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Increased strain on Cuban patrol resources.

Increased morale of Exiles.

Increased morale of internal resistance.

REPERCUSSIONS

Charges of U. S. sponsorship.

Increased vigilance of Cuban patrols.

Increased Soviet deliveries of sea and air patrol craft.

Aggressive Cuban patrols may cause incidents thru attack on innocent ships.

Possible reprisal attacks.

Estimate of Soviet Reactions:

As in the case of earlier exile attacks on Cuban shipping, the Soviets will be intent on demonstrating or at least alleging U. S. culpability and to draw from the U. S. some sort of a commitment not to support further such activities. A sizable Soviet propaganda campaign is probable including possible recourse to the UN. Moscow is under some handicap, however, in alleging U. S. involvement because if it makes too much of a case it will lay itself open to Chinese assertions that it was

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gullible last October in accepting U. S. non-invasion assurances.

There almost certainly would not be any direct Soviet counter-action outside the immediate vicinity of Cuba and, even in the Cuban area, the Soviets are likely to let the Cubans themselves carry the brunt of the response. Within these general limits, the Soviets may supply the Cubans with additional hardware (various small craft, aircraft with air-to-surface weapons and coastal weapons) and training with which to counter the program. The Cubans themselves might be encouraged to undertake some hit-and-run raids of their own, though the Soviets would recognize that if such retaliation were to escalate into US-Cuban incidents a dangerous crisis could soon ensue. Soviet ability to support the Cubans militarily would of course be very limited. The Soviets are therefore likely to be quite cautious in encouraging any aggressive Cuban responses.

C. EXTERNALLY MOUNTED HIT AND RUN ATTACKS AGAINST

LAND TARGETS

Attacks by external assets against targets of minor economic importance would be primarily harassment, while attacks against major economic targets would be sabotage. Illustrative examples of harassment


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targets are the molasses tanker anchored off Cayo Frances (North Matanzas), the petroleum storage facilities at Casilda, unidentified government activity on various keys and capes such as Cabo Juan Tomas (North Pinar del Rio) and Cayo Frances (North Matanzas), the military airfield at Baracoa (North Oriente), naval refueling and base facilities at Tunas de Zazas and Jucaro on the south coast of Las Villas and Camaguey provinces, and railroad and highway bridges near the coast. Sabotage targets include the petroleum refinery ~~at Santiago de Cuba~~ and electric power plants such as the one ~~near~~ ~~Matanzas.~~ //

CAPABILITIES

Two separate groups of Cubans, one of 22 men and one of 16 men, have been given thorough paramilitary training and while only a few have had any operational experience they are considered operationally ready, the effectiveness of the men under combat conditions is unknown. The size of the team to be infiltrated for the attacks will vary, depending on the target and method of attack. Sophisticated targetting and planning will be required and may necessitate specialized training and equipment. The operational tasks envisaged in harassment, such as recoilless rifle or mortar fire, on selected Cuban installations are simpler than the more complex ones associated with the

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sabotage attacks. The harassment targets will usually be much more accessible than the sabotage targets and the limited missions assigned will be of relatively short duration - a few hours ashore at most and then out - all of which will enhance the chances of success. As the men gain experience under fire, they will become more willing aggressively to press their attacks which in turn will increase the impact on the GOC of these activities.


As operational experience is gained the capability for complex sabotage operations will be enhanced but we feel the possibility of this type of complex operation going awry will remain high and the risk may prove to be unacceptable. Our targetting and planning capability for this type of operation is considered adequate but will improve with additional experience.

PACE

The first harassment attacks could be mounted in April. Preliminary targetting has been done on an oil storage facility at Casilda near Trinidad, Southern Las Villas and this tentatively would be the first target.

The first sabotage operation could be mounted in May. Preliminary targetting has begun on the Santiago oil refinery //

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as the first target. Thereafter, one harassment attack per month or one sabotage attack every six weeks to two months could be programmed. The number of sabotage targets which can be attacked in this manner is limited.

BENEFITS

Harassment Attacks

Increased morale in exile community.

Some increase in morale of internal resistance elements.

Minor or short term economic disruption.

Increased strain on Cuban land and naval patrols.

Sabotage Attacks: Same as above except

Major economic disruption.

Increased strain on Soviet aid.

REPERCUSSIONS

Charges of U. S. sponsorship.

Increased vigilance of Cuban patrol forces.

Increased Soviet deliveries of patrol craft.

Aggressive Cuban patrols may cause incidents thru attacks on innocent ships.

Increased internal security force activities.

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Possible reprisal attacks.

Estimate of Soviet Reactions:

In this case, the Soviets would be under rather more pressure than in the previous ones to come to the direct support of the Cubans since actual attacks on Cuban territory would be involved. Ultimately, the Soviets would however still be conscious of their inability to provide meaningful military support without running high risks of escalation.

Consequently, Soviet responses would be much as those indicated in the previous case: A propaganda-political campaign to establish U. S. involvement designed at a minimum to pillory the U. S. and at a maximum to get the U. S. to stop the program; and additional supplies and training for the Cubans to enable them to resist the incursions more effectively. As in the previous case, the Soviets might encourage the Cubans to do some raiding of their own but they would take care not to become directly involved in such activities and to leave open avenues for their own disengagement in case the situation began to escalate into a dangerous crisis.

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
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D. SUPPORT OF INTERNAL RESISTANCE ELEMENTS

Provide guidance and support, both materiel and personnel, to internal resistance elements to permit them to undertake a variety of sabotage and harassment operations. This will be an intensification and augmentation of the subtle sabotage program previously cited. In some cases, it will be possible to control or influence the choice of targets and methods of attack; in other cases the internal elements being supported will attack targets of their own choosing and in their own manner. The use of internal elements will be particularly effective against economic targets, such as electric distribution systems, electric plants, oil refineries in ~~Havana~~ and the ~~Nicaraguan~~ nickel plant which our external assets cannot attack within acceptable risk limits. In the main, however, the targets attacked by the internal elements will be targets of opportunity in line with the capabilities and desires of the individuals or groups participating and will be relatively small operations with a cumulative and hopefully snowballing effect.

CAPABILITIES

We have one black team now in place which has a significant potential for sabotage and harassment attacks if we provide the required guidance and support. The infiltration of additional teams is underway as part of our intelligence




collection program. We can re-orient some of these teams for sabotage harassment purposes. A number of singleton agents are also in place in Cuba. Their potential for sabotage and harassment varies but will be explored and exploited as appropriate.

Materiel is available to support the internal assets and a variety of means exist for getting it to them - the principal means being maritime infiltration, diplomatic channels, and concealment in open mail. The reliability of these infiltration mechanisms will be a limiting factor. Every effort will be made to have the internal assets utilize indigenous materials which can be procured legally or illegally. Trained agents are available for infiltration to provide know-how and leadership to internal elements which have the capability to safe-house and utilize them. Instructions on methods of attacking various types of targets and other forms of operational guidance are available and can be made available to internal elements in a number of ways.

PACE

The existing team in Southern Pinar del Rio, the recently infiltrated team in Northern Las Villas, and the




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singleton agents now in place can be queried immediately as to their capabilities for sabotage and harassment, the support they would require, and the probable timing of the actions. If appropriate, materiel could be delivered relatively quickly by maritime infiltration; the utilization of other means will have to be further explored but it is certain that at least some types of materiel could be introduced within 30 days. Initial sabotage operations would probably take place within 30 days.

Other teams scheduled for infiltration or being held for other programs could be oriented toward sabotage and harassment and could attempt to develop such programs upon infiltrating.

A series of caching operations could be started immediately to provide a source of supply for assets which might develop. The number of such operations per month would depend on the allocation of maritime assets but initially one per month could be undertaken without prejudice to previous cited sabotage programs.

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BENEFITS

Possibility of major economic damage.

Increased morale and inoperation for internal resistance elements.

Increased strain on Cuban security forces.

Evidence to world that Castro has not succeeded.

REPERCUSSIONS

Probable loss of some of our intelligence assets.

Increased repressive security measures.

Allegations of U. S. sponsorship and involvement.

Possible reprisals in U. S.

Estimate of Soviet Reactions:

Soviet responses to this type of activity are again likely to be largely in the propaganda and political realms. The Soviets might, however, offer more active support to the Cubans to help suppress internal resistance elements. And they might judge the risks of their involvement in such counter-action to be smaller than in the previous cases because it would be occurring within Cuban territory. But it is uncertain to what extent Soviet equipment and forces now in Cuba are suitable for internal

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security operations. More importantly, the Soviets would not be keen either to risk the lives of their own personnel or to become openly involved in killing Cubans. Consequently, their support would probably be largely in the form of supplies and perhaps training, although they probably do not have much that they are able to teach the Cubans in how to conduct irregular warfare.

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